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Abstract— This paper describes the continuation of a research 
project to identify and develop tools for the identification and 
management of hazards likely to arise with the quality and 
reliability of automatic advice – such as in an automated system 
advisory function, especially where supporting a “Sense & 
Avoid” capability as embodied within an airborne autonomous 
system.  An earlier literature survey has been used to map detail 
onto a Use Case model representing an outline certifiable system 
development process; thereby helping to identify an appropriate 
research direction within the broad range of potential end-user 
requirements.  From this direction, an approach has emerged to 
evaluate hypothetical deviations from declared intent within a 
behavioral modeling framework to be styled upon Owen’s 
STAMP-Based Hazard Analysis (STPA) [1].  For this approach 
an outline exemplar describing an air-proximity hazard arising 
between two air-vehicles has been developed, and the 
representation of the control structure and system dynamics 
describing this model are considered.  Arising from this model 
some consideration is then given towards the expression of a 
more systematic approach in the construction of such models, 
leading towards new methods to derive safety requirements for 
implementation within autonomous air systems. 
Keywords- systems engineering; requirements analysis; hazard 
analysis; autonomous systems; certification; behavioural modelling 
I.  INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND  
Airworthiness authorities expect Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems (UAS) to present no greater risk to life than a manned 
aircraft from hazards arising from unexpected events or 
airborne failures, and the removal of the pilot alone is unlikely 
to eliminate the tendency to seek “pilot error” as a possible 
cause in accidents.  Of particular concern to authorities is the 
possibility of collisions between uninhabited air vehicles and 
another inhabited aircraft.  An autonomous system will be 
expected to maintain itself in a safe state following any 
manageable upset event, which must certainly extend to 
specific critical UAS capabilities – such as the required Sense 
and Avoid capability for operation in un-segregated airspace. 
Consequently, regulations are expected to ensure that such 
systems demonstrate at least a level of safety equivalent to that 
of manned aircraft – some go further requiring that “pilot 
equivalence” be demonstrated; which with interpretation might 
be expected to have the following implications: 
 A capability to manage faults and respond to events 
while the system is under autonomous control; 
 The diagnoses of functional loss and provision of 
prognoses of likely outcomes against options 
contingent upon unpredictable events; 
 The identification and reduction of all identifiable 
hazards caused by false alarms and unintended 
interactions arising from the associated sensing, 
advisory systems, users and other participants. 
The system dynamics of a UAS interacting with other 
airspace users, and Air Traffic Control, is by definition 
mathematically complex, exhibiting emergent behavior.  
Derived aircraft system safety requirements are conventionally 
formulated within a system safety assessment processes which 
tend towards a static view of anticipated system safety behavior 
conditioned only by estimated human and component failure 
rates.  Where complex system dynamics are known to be 
present, with interactions between system entities not fully 
understood, and emergent properties likely, then dynamics and 
safety constraint violation modeling might also be considered.   
II. HAZARD MODELLING RESEARCH PROGRAMME SCOPE 
It is noted by Allenby, et al [2], that in developing an 
integrated approach to system safety assessment that there are 
similarities between FHA (Functional Hazard Assessment) [3] 
and HAZOP (Hazard & Operation) processes.  In considering 
further the combining of HAZOP and FHA Allenby, et al [2], 
also state that both methods systematically consider 
hypothetical deviations from declared intent, whereas safety 
analysis techniques such as FMEA (Failure Modes and Effects 
Analysis) assess only the effects of known behavior. 
Therefore, so as to aid understanding of the certification 
system requirements within the context of a larger systems 
engineering problem, a provisional model based design 
representation of the aircraft certification process has been 
constructed, and requirements thereof analyzed [4].  The 
resultant model serves as the reference point in the 
understanding of the process of assessing any safety related 
aircraft function – at least in outline.  Following a system 
requirements analysis, the further developed model, as depicted 
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Figure 1.  Scoping a Hazard Modelling Research Programme 
A. Research questions and challenges 
Treating this requirement for a complex system safety 
assessment method as a Systems Engineering issue, then a 
number of questions arise.  Does a tractable failure analysis 
methodology exist to predict the consequences of system 
failure, including false alarms, and unintended interactions 
within a high integrity autonomous system?  What is the nature 
of any models representing the processes that enforce defensive 
barriers and safety constraints within the encompassing socio-
technical system?  And, how might system requirements, 
design errors, and implementation errors for any system of 
interest be represented with such a behavioral model? 
Assuming that a behavioral modeling approach does prove 
tractable, then for such a model, how might partitioning across 
phases of flight, design constraints, annunciation of failure 
conditions, advisories, recommended actions, and machine 
autonomous decisions be represented?  Also, how might one 
validate a system hazard and system dynamics model, 
providing the necessary supporting evidence where these are to 
be used to obtain a specification of system performance and 
advisory requirements related to autonomous system behavior?  
Consequently, what is required from various known safety 
assessment techniques such as FMEA, HAZOP  analysis, and 
Leveson’s STAMP (System Theoretic Accident Model and 
Processes [5]), to help identify appropriate strategies? 
III. HAZARD ANALYSIS 
A. Options for combining methods 
Consequently, ranked pairs of options combining safety 
assessment methods have been considered, encompassing the 
various features accommodated by each of the six possible 
pairings of HAZOP, STAMP, FMEA (itself taken together 
with FTA – Fault Tree Analysis), and FFA (Function Failure 
Analysis).  Note that FMEA, FTA and FFA together constitute 
the larger part of FHA, as described in ARP 4761 [3]. 
B. Hypothesis and proposal 
Hypothesis – Risk events within complex adaptive systems 
are caused by deviations from design or operating intentions 
and unanticipated non-linear casual interactions among system 
elements that violate safety constraints, therefore, a narrowly 
focused technique is unlikely to identify all the major 
problems.  Such that:  
 The combination of the HAZOP and STAMP related 
methods will best realize the means to accurately 
assess these system risk events;  
 A meta-model capturing system risk event and system 
failure behavior can be constructed, unifying the 
HAZOP and STAMP methodologies;  
 The complete coverage of the system risk event space 
will not be achieved without consideration also of the 
role of mission phase and probabilistic causes in a 
unified accident causation model. 
In order to confirm, validate, or falsify, this hypothesis it is 
proposed that a comparison be made ultimately within an 
exemplar analysis between the “unified” method, proposed 
above, and a conventional aerospace Functional Hazard 
Assessment, see ARP 4761 [3]; forming together in effect a 
complementary combination of safety analysis  methods. 
IV. HAZARD MODELLING 
 
Figure 2.  Behavioural Evolution of a Scenario 
 
Pursuant to the objective of developing a “unified” hazard 
analysis method, eventually also to draw upon the techniques 
of HAZOP, STAMP [5] and STPA [1, 6], a collision avoidance 
scenario has been constructed complying with the Rules of the 
Air [7].  In this interaction certain behaviors have been 
assigned to each entity.  The non-cooperative traffic entity – 
assumed to be a relatively dumb traffic entity – is assigned only 
two goals; to maintain its given heading but reconcile this with 
the goal of doing so within the requirements of the rules of the 
air.  The UAS has been assigned three levels of behavior within 
the model, and has attributed to it two likely sources of 
misbehavior.  These basic attributes are considered sufficient to 
investigate the first-cut representational forms for design intent 
and failure of design intent, along with a representation of 
hazardous constraint violation – principally a minimum 
separation constraint, short of actual collision. 
V. CAUSAL LOOP MODELLING 
A. Bottom up interaction modelling 
The systems dynamics model associated with the scenario, 
as illustrated in Figure 2, is constructed using the causal loop 
notation developed in the work of Jay W. Forrester, and others, 
describing dynamic couplings and influences between various 
system elements and parameters in a form suitable for 
exploration of a system’s dynamical behavior; a small part is 
shown in Figure 3.  This first prototypical model has been 
constructed to explore the representational and modeling issues 
from the bottom-up, although the decomposition within safety 
assessment methods are themselves top-down.  The reason for 
this is that the model attempts to identify a range of suitable 
behavioral abstractions applicable to the design intent within 
the physical reality.  Higher level abstractions regarding system 
intent, operations, and management perceptions and behaviors 
are to be considered in a later stage of the work, as these then 
must also fit with models of design intent and physical reality.   
A further reason to employ bottom-up development is that this 
is more likely to realize a reusable modeling paradigm.  
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Figure 3.  Avoidance Scenario Initial State 
At the lowest level of the avoidance scenario the initial set-
up for this hazard assumes an imminent breach of horizontal 
separation, and in the case of head-on or for crossing traffic 
then the presupposition of a level bust also.  It becomes 
apparent that it would be useful to identify the different 
categories of interaction: 
 Fundamental physical and spatial proximity 
relationships,  low-level irreducible behaviors; 
 Interactions with other systems (ATC, air vehicles); 
 Interactions and derived parameters within the system 
of interest; 
 Parameters derived from fixed external conditions and 
preconditions; 
 Scenario stop events; e.g. Collision. 
The intent is to develop a hazard modeling framework as a 
Model Based Systems Engineering methodology. 
B. Systematic Error Modelling 
The approach taken in the representation of a plausible 
misbehavior has been to turn the representational problem on 
its head somewhat – in that the representation is one of how a 
specific function might act against design intent, rather than a 
representation of design intent.  For example, one obvious act 
against design intent is to misestimate the separation distance 
between the two vehicles, as illustrated below in Figure 4.  
However, such an error will be bounded with the limits of a 
worst case error in calculating the predicted conflicting track.  
Rather than build a model of the actual track algorithm, a 
model of the geometrical plausibility of the track conflict 
detection is constructed instead, as shown below.  Only if an 
estimate falls within plausible bounds for all of the related 
systematic errors (ϵi) does the model represent certainty of 
action – in this case emergency avoidance. 
∀ i (ϵ lower, i < Estimated Value < ϵ upper, i) → Intended Behaviour 
 
 
Figure 4.  Misestimating Separation 
 
Within the overall dynamical behavioral model this then 
describes a plausible and missed conflict detection model, 
capturing a particular likely failure of design intent.  The 
effects of this can be dynamically explored by varying the 
degree of misestimating – right out to the most implausible of 
limits; for example a negative estimate placing the conflicting 
vehicle on the wrong side of the encounter.  Therefore, this 
model defines the outer limits to be applied to errors within 
which plausible detection will occur.  If the actual given error 
is outside of the range of any of these error limits then the 
detection of the threat from the conflicting traffic is deemed as 
unlikely to occur – with the likely consequence being that the 
UAS vehicle continues upon its present heading, or otherwise 
as dictated by the Rules of the Air. 
This misestimating of the distance to the threatening traffic, 
as perceived by the system, is only one plausible source of 
error.  Another likely source of misbehavior lies also in the 
delay in responding to the threatening traffic.  Therefore, a 
simple information delay model is included in this example. 
C. Rule Modelling 
Another requirement of a model capturing design intent is 
to consider the incorporation of operational rules; and at higher 
levels of abstraction design rules also.  In this case these are the 
Rules of the Air Regulations 2007, General Flight Rules [7]: 
 Avoiding aerial collisions – 8(5) … an aircraft which 
has the right-of-way under this rule shall maintain its 
course and speed. 
 Converging – 9(3) … when two aircraft are converging 
in the air at approximately the same altitude, the 
aircraft which has the other on its right shall give way. 
 Approaching head-on – 10 When two aircraft are 
approaching head-on, or approximately so, in the air 
and there is a danger of collision, each shall alter its 
course to the right. 
 Overtaking – 11(1) … an aircraft which is being 
overtaken in the air shall have the right-of-way and the 
overtaking aircraft, whether climbing, descending or in 
horizontal flight, shall keep out of the way of the other 
aircraft by altering course to the right. 
These rules, Figure 5, have been implemented within a 
simple two input fuzzy controller using causal loop notation. 
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Figure 5.  Premises for Rules 8, 9, 10 & 11 
D. Behavioural Modelling 
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Figure 6.  Avoidance Behavior as Subsumption Architecture 
A further consideration is the requirement to capture design 
intent with respect to behavior.  For this it is proposed that a 
suitable model might be found in the field of behavior-based 
robotics, for example the Subsumption Architecture, after 
Brooks [8], and as illustrated in Figure 6; at least for machine 
based behavioral intent.  In this example, collision avoidance 
has been modeled as behavior-based robotics architecture – 
illustrating here the suppression of the Rules of the Air in the 
event of an emergency behavior to avoid an imminent collision 
with threatening traffic.  Whilst this representation may not 
model the actual software implementation, it might be argued 
that this does capture design intent, and instead be used to 
capture a behavioral requirement rather than a design solution.  
Again, this model might be represented with system dynamics 
model prototype in causal loop notation, as shown in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7.  Incorporating Rules and Behaviour 
VI. EMERGENCE 
In terms of exploring design intent within a complex 
system, that is one likely to exhibit emergent behavior; it might 
be argued that is sufficient to attempt to correctly capture 
characteristic behavior.  That is capturing the characteristics of 
both the desired and undesired behavior, and the behavior 
arising from the design intent and the emergent properties – 
ever-present within complex systems interacting within an 
uncertain non-static environment. This, rather than exact 
system behavior, might better typify how we then expect a 
partial system to behave, such that to this we may then later 
add additional controlling interactions and higher levels of 
behavior to explore. For example, Figures 8 and 9 both 
represent resultant dynamic behavior from the model 
demonstrating the characteristic behavior of this interactive 
system; constrained to two spatial dimensions.  Within the 
terms of the “Rules of the Air” both of these represent legal 
characteristic behaviors – notwithstanding the actual degree of 
separation loss.  In both cases each vehicle executes a 
maneuver in a legal manner. 
However, due to the continuously changing relative 
positions and relative bearings of the two vehicles, and the 
further interaction of the internal competing behavioral models, 
a variety of emergent behaviors have been observed; some of 
which might not be so obvious or as originally conceived. 
 
Figure 8.  Interactions for Initial Separation at 234° & 0.5 nm 
For example an expected emergent behavior is observed at 
a “break out” point where the UAV elects to turn left to pass 
behind the conflicting traffic coming from the right – near to 
238.5° in the 0.5 nm case.  This ensures that a collision does 
not occur and fulfills at least a basic requirement of the rules of 
the air to pass behind crossing traffic from the right.  Less 
expected is an entrainment of the vehicles that can occur when 
arriving at parallel tracks and travelling at nearly the same 
speed. 
For this encounter and scenario, the minimum separation 
falls to within 449.32 ft, which could be considered an unsafe 
air proximity event.  Figure 8 represents this close but 
marginally unsafe interaction, whilst directly applying the rules 
of the air.  Figure 9 demonstrates a phase transition due to a 
further internal interaction occurring with the UAS emergency 
maneuver behavior, giving a closest approach of 1787.84 ft. 
 
Figure 9.  Interactions for Initial Separation at 243° & 0.5 nm 
VII. EXTENDING THE HAZARD MODELLING 
The modeling of the overall effect upon hazards, such as 
the violation of separation constraint, is a complex problem and 
a means of obtaining insight is to model the system dynamics.  
In this example, the 0.5 nm scenario at 94.25 kts exhibits five 
distinct dynamic behaviors dependent upon the relative 
heading: (A) entrainment (near the same speed); (B) direct 
 
 
compliant avoidance; (C) compliant avoidance with reduced 
separation; (D) loss of safe separation (insufficient space for 
right turn); and (E) suppressed Rules of the Air; in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10.  Separation as Constraint Violation 
However, the “quality” of the design intent of such a 
system is as likely to be judged on the possibilities of 
generating an air proximity arising as it is for speculative 
probabilistic collision rates.  Therefore the constraint to be 
modeled might more appropriately relate to this possibility, 
wherein different categories of potential hazard are defined 
with categorized causal factors such as those given in Table 1. 
TABLE I.  DOMINANT AIRPROX CAUSAL FACTORS [9] 
Air Proximity Causal Factors 
Cause Attributed to 
Did not separate / poor judgement Controller 
Climbed / descended through assigned level Pilot 
Did not see conflicting traffic Pilot 
Inadequate avoiding action / flew too close Pilot 
Late sighting of conflicting traffic Pilot 
Misinterpretation of ATC message Pilot 
Not obeying orders / following advice from ATC Pilot 
Penetration of CAS/SRZ/ATZ without clearance Pilot 
Conflict in other type of airspace Other 
Air Proximity Causal Factors 
Cause Attributed to 
FIR conflict Other 
Sighting Report Other 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
Therefore further work is yet to be undertaken to formulate 
a representation to encompass the more complex view of a 
system incorporating air-proximity constraints, and later 
maintenance process models.  These are to be layered upon the 
current physical model layer, and developed into 
representational models in SysML.  The intent is to initiate the 
further development of tools to investigate cause & hazard 
effect sensitivity scenarios – and to support trade studies.  This 
would include the facilitation of the free exploration of “What-
if” hypotheses – enabling investigations with multiple cause 
analysis, and anomalous hazardous event sequencing, false 
alarm, and misdiagnosis coupling; advisory and diagnostic 
function discrimination performance determination – 
supporting performance trade-off against Design Assurance 
Level; and hopefully the possibility of re-usable and extendable 
hazard model modules.  The challenge is to find appropriate, or 
better yet, correct paradigms for behavioral modeling of system 
hazards. 
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